The Digital Euro: A New Monetary Instrument?

The concept of the "monetary instrument," despite its essential nature, has been overlooked. The 2023 draft regulation establishing the digital euro—the future official currency issued by the European Central Bank (ECB)—introduces a confusion between "money" (monnaie) and "payment instruments." It will necessitate a revision of the French legal definition of "means of payment." The true revolution lies in the ECB’s settlement infrastructure, which could diminish the role of commercial banks as currency custodians and providers of payment instruments. Citizens will hold electronic liquidity akin to "digital cash," accessible via the ECB’s application or Payment Service Providers (PSPs). This innovation is set to fundamentally transform payment systems.

1. A Duality of Technicality and Linguistic Sovereignty. The question at the heart of this subject is doubly technical: it is both legal and computational. A review of the European Commission’s proposal of June 28, 2023 (No. 2023/0212) establishing the digital euro confirms this. Yet, it is also a question of linguistic sovereignty. National authorities, under the influence of European bodies, "construct law" through a linguistic compromise that, with each new regulation or directive, erodes national legal terminology. Resistance is weak, if not impossible, resulting in a form of "linguisticide" of the French legal language—a phenomenon that transcends the natural evolution of any living tongue.

2. The Confusion between Money and Payment Instruments. This future regulation, in its richness and length, illustrates the extravagance of European administration; it took six times fewer articles to institute the Euro itself. The draft regulation categorizes the digital euro as a "means of payment." This could lead to the digital euro being qualified as a "payment instrument" (PI). Indeed, current law states that means of payment are PIs, without explicitly including currency. This flaw in French positive law reflects a fundamental weakness: the commingling of distinct concepts.

French law must be amended, yet it remains doubtful that the necessary clarity will be achieved. A payment instrument is not money; it serves or facilitates the transport of money. The current confusion of terms obscures this. No law can repeal this summa divisio of pure reason without fundamentally altering the very notion of money. This confusion suggests we have taken a path where digital, computational money—the essence of modern currency—will be reduced to a mere contractual arrangement: a "Payment Instrument"? The danger is all the greater because it remains unacknowledged. Today, a PI is less a traditional title and more a convention establishing protocols between a client and a PSP for the delivery of money (French Monetary and Financial Code, Art. L. 133-4, c). The legal policy of the EU and the ECB risks debasing money into a mere contractual fact—a path also trodden by cryptocurrency promoters who relegate money to a private, conventional status.

3. A Monetary Revolution and the Threat to Deposits. The June 28, 2023 proposal establishes the digital euro but also, one might argue, a monetary revolution. This is evidenced by the current protests from the banking sector. The digital euro has the potential to drain bank accounts, whereas money typically fills them, providing the primary funding for banks. Under the proposed regulation, the ECB is paradoxically positioned to capture the function of monetary deposit—the very foundation of banking law, which is, directly or otherwise, a component of monetary status. Credit institutions are tasked with the custody and allocation of money; this project threatens that equilibrium.

4. Revolutionary Features. Revolutionary traits underpin the project. Politically, viewing money solely as a "means of payment"—a conviction held by central banks—fails a priori to defend the integrity of currency. This is certainly true in theory. In practice, the theoretical devaluation of money, relegated to a mere payment tool, could perhaps be counterbalanced by other factors.

5. The Convergence of Money and Payment Instruments. In the proposed regulation, the digital euro is conflated with Payment Instruments (PIs). This stems, firstly, from the linguistic confusion already noted and, secondly, from the objective convergence between money and PIs. Electronic money previously illustrated this, though its specific PIs remained rare (CMF, Art. L. 315-9). Furthermore, the exclusivity of banks—or rather, the "P" (Providers)—prevented a total merger of the two. Traditionally, with the exception of the cheque—still occasionally mislabeled as "scriptural money" when it is merely its instrument—one does not confuse a PI with money. A PI facilitates the transport, displacement, or transfer of money, but it is not money itself. Moreover, the legal conception of electronic money marginalized this issue by stating that an e-money card represents a claim for reimbursement against the issuing bank (in truth, it should have been defined as electronic euros, mutatis mutandis, equivalent to cash). Nonetheless, this example provided an opportunity to observe the distinction between currency and PIs, even if legislative policy failed to dissipate existing errors.

6. The Objective Alignment in the Future Regulation. The objective convergence is even more palpable in the forthcoming regulation. By providing for the custody, distribution, and handling of the digital euro, the regulation grants the ECB (or the ECB grants itself) the power to create and distribute pure PIs, which will support and operate the electronic units. In a sense, the ECB is becoming a Payment Service Provider (PSP)!

7. An Extraordinary Metamorphosis: The ECB as a Paneuropean PSP. An extraordinary transformation is underway. The ECB will be in a position to provide services currently rendered by hundreds of actors in France (at least 200 credit institutions, 200 payment institutions, and a few rare electronic money institutions). It is becoming, by right, a paneuropean PSP! Furthermore, it becomes the (central) PSP of (commercial) PSPs, just as it is the bank of (commercial) banks. A fresh perspective on PIs explains this: the ECB’s smartphone application, allowing payments in digital euros, must be seen in an unprecedented way as a PI. This application is destined to become one of the most famous in Europe; one fully realizes the magnitude of this (unprecedented?) claim, yet it conforms to the broad and abstract definition of PIs established by the Payment Services Directive (PSD) nearly twenty years ago. Any process facilitating a transfer of money is a PI. The European Digital Identity Wallet (EDIW) will also be one, even if designed for other purposes. Here, too, lies a revolutionary trait.

8. Beyond the Regulation’s Title: The Lost "Monetary Instrument". From this perspective, the question transcends the regulation’s title. We are eluding the general linguistic debate over "monetary instruments," "payment instruments," and "means of payment." The subject must be treated with greater technicality, and it certainly is! A linguistic debate might seem futile because, for a long time, French legal terminology has not been employed with clarity. The concept of the "monetary instrument"—an expression of low intensity but traditional weight—has been lost by the legal community. This is a paradox: while for half a century the legal order has been invaded by the notion of "instrument" (notably with financial instruments and PIs), the specific "monetary instrument" highlighted by Carbonnier has been forgotten. The digital euro is granted no better qualification, being placed by default at the level of coins and (central bank) banknotes—the very liquidity the regulation intends it to possess.

9. The Nature of the Digital Euro: A Form of Currency. The digital euro is money; it is currency. The regulation affirms this by adopting, and even improving upon, monetary law: "The digital euro is established as a digital form of the single currency" (Art. 3). In short, the digital euro is one of the monetary instruments of the euro unit, alongside coins and banknotes—an addition I make here, as the regulation does not explicitly state it.

One smiles when reading (on social media, admittedly) that the digital euro is merely a "stablecoin." If cryptocurrencies had not been invented, nothing would exist: the ECB could not have invented its CBDC. Militancy in this area exhausts all reason! The EU and the ECB are paying the price for an old hesitation: when electronic money was created, it should have been affirmed as a form of currency. It would then be easy today to state that there is another form of euro—a digital one. But the issuance of money by "commercial banks" must have caused alarm. The prerogative to issue the digital euro is simpler and more reassuring. While the term "monetary instrument" is lost, the idea of a "form of money" seems appropriate.

10. Concept, Notion, and Definition. The digital euro is no better defined than the euro itself. We are aware of the descriptive and doctrinally neutral definition in Article L. 111-1 of the CMF. The regulation could have done better. On this sensitive subject, it is essential to distinguish between concept, notion, and definition—a distinction seldom made in legal analysis. A definition, somewhat academically, summarizes the characteristics of a notion to delimit the scope of rules. The notion of money can be defined as a monetary unit represented by monetary instruments. From this, one can derive a definition including established techniques (legal tender, nominalism, convertibility). Ideally, a definition must be founded on a discriminant criterion; a definition describing ten mechanisms of an institution is a mere exposition of its legal regime, not a definition.

11. The Culture of Non-Definition. The European Union carries a discreet culture of non-definition. Definitions in regulations and directives are often remarkably flat. In legal doctrine, general works rarely bother to define money while claiming to explain financial operations. One must admit the exercise is difficult. The current period is at a peak of confusion; money is no longer money, it is "fiat money" as the MiCA regulation incessantly repeats, consecrating "electronic money tokens," which is equivocal. Economic doctrine, which drives monetary authorities, lacks the science of millennial legal structures and risks inspiring erroneous definitions.

12. Institutional Aspects and "Awareness". Article 5 governs various institutional aspects, specifying how the digital euro will be "managed"—a term far too convenient—by ECB standards and PSD rules. Article 6 concludes on an odd note: Member States shall ensure they "raise awareness" among the public. "Raise awareness"... we are nearly at the point of mandatory recruitment of "influencers." Does the ESCB feel so weak?

13. Legal Tender: A Weakening Concept? Chapter III of the regulation addresses legal tender, yet despite its six articles, it fails to provide a pure monetary narrative. Article 7 summarizes the position in two points: first, "The digital euro shall have legal tender status"; second, its status implies "mandatory acceptance, at its nominal value, as a means of payment with power to discharge debt."
A debt will be paid at parity with the sum of digital euros, and without fees (Point 4). Here, obvious monetary theory is bent: the PI or the ECB application used for payment shall not alter this rule. The monetary rule seems to immunize the payment process against the invoicing of payment services. This is legislation that strives to be vigorous but proves to be soft: this mechanism of payment at parity is understood as pure monetary law if the digital euro is indeed the euro. Has this not been stated clearly enough, or is it not believed by the regulation's authors?
Furthermore, Article 8 limits the digital euro to debts expressed in euros—limiting contractual freedom. Strong currencies possess an international vocation by virtue of their value, which, through a cumulative effect, is enhanced by extraterritorial use.

14. Exceptions and Functional Confusions. The digital euro may be refused in several distinct cases: if the payee is a small enterprise, has a legitimate motive, is a natural person, or has "agreed" with the payer on another means of payment (Art. 9). The last case is a mixing of genres, as it is manifestly foreign to the question of legal tender. These cases suggest that the payee may be unable to accept digital euros—though will "Tap to Pay" not assist?
Again, the problem belongs to the realm of PIs and payment terminals. The draft provision conflates, in my view, monetary law with PI law. If the digital euro begins within this confusion, it risks being radically conflated with simple PIs. Article 10 prohibits "unilaterally" excluding digital euro payments, targeting general contractual conditions. We are once again dealing with a question of PI utilization/acceptance. The unit of account itself cannot be refused. The linguistic flaw denounced earlier becomes a fundamental conceptual problem in the legislation.

15. Legal Theory and Convertibility. Regarding electronic money, the law speaks of a claim for reimbursement against the issuing bank, while simultaneously—and in my view, contradictorily—designating it as "monetary value." A financial object called "electronic money" that is a "monetary value" is, quite simply, money. Monetary sovereignty requires, among other things, the authority of the Word. Weak language cannot support a sovereign notion—that of money.
The regulation now includes the technical monetary concept of "convertibility" at parity with coins and banknotes (Art. 12). The "claim for convertibility" is a right to conversion. This aligns with technical monetary culture. A monetary instrument is convertible, not "reimbursable" in another instrument or currency. However, this is stated not to affirm the quality of convertibility, but merely to ensure legal tender status—an involuntary contribution?

16. The Central Role of PSPs and Central Bank. Competition PSPs occupy a nearly central place under a chapter heading that mixes genres: "Store of Value" and "Means of Payment" (Art. 13-14, 18-20). The digital euro will be distributed by both the ESCB and PSPs. These two cases are not on the same legal footing. Central banks will distribute the digital euro under a purely statutory regime, whereas PSPs will incorporate this regime into contractual general conditions. The EDIW (European Digital Identity Wallet) will host the ECB application (Art. 25). This recalls the era when the Banque de France held bank accounts for individuals, providing them with checkbooks. This touches upon the competition between PSPs and (national or European) central banks. The European Union conflates money with means of payment; this may have prevented it from imagining an adherence to a pure public service of custody and circulation of public-law electronic money, distinct from a private-law contractual relationship.

17. Store of Value and Monetary Policy. The economic thought that describes money by its three functions—including that of a store of value—emerges here. To define and implement monetary policy, the use of the digital euro as a store of value may be subject to limits (Art. 15). The "store of value" aspect is merely a rule of use: for any citizen, being able to preserve one's money is already a form of use, all the more so when spending it.

18. Functionalities and the "IBAN". Paradox Functionalities contribute to the definition of the digital euro (Chap. VII, Art. 22-24). Users will be required to open a "digital euro payment account" with a "unique digital euro payment account number"—in plain terms, an IBAN. Article 22(4) states that "Each digital euro payment account may be attached to one or several non-digital euro payment accounts." The term "non-digital euro" confirms the doctrinal weakness in monetary matters. This "attachment" to another account means little in law. While a certain unity between these accounts will be observed, a payment account will not be strictly necessary to hold a digital euro account. The overlap between money, instrument, and account is at its peak; the innovation proceeds from confusion.

19. Offline vs. Online: A Functional Distinction. Article 23 establishes offline and online digital euro payment transactions. Theory is reinforced by a rule "for the layperson": "Digital euro held online and digital euro held offline shall be convertible between them at parity." One digital euro equals one digital euro. It is clear that the digital euro has a scriptural form due to its digital nature. Online payment transactions are settled within the "digital euro settlement infrastructure"—a computer system (Art. 2, 14). Offline payment utilizes the storage capacities of the payer’s and payee’s devices (Art. 2, 15).

20. Distribution and the "Mobile" as a PI. Under the distribution section (Art. 25-33), this new "means of payment" appears highly complex. The regulation addresses European Digital Identity Wallet, interoperability, dispute resolution, and access to mobile devices (Art. 33). These final paragraphs are perhaps the first to bring the "mobile" into the field of the PI (is it the device or the application that is the PI, or both?). "Final settlement" of online transactions occurs when the transfer is recorded in the settlement infrastructure: this is, in a sense, the Law of the System, which also applies to offline settlement (Art. 30).

21. Privacy, Personal Data, and Public Trust. The PSPs perform a form of public interest mission when processing personal data for digital euro transactions (Art. 34 et seq.). This will be met with resistance from a portion of the population that suspects the authorities (the ECB?) of monitoring and tracing all citizen acts. Protected and segregated data may not inspire confidence; is it not true that to find the author of a crime, one will trace their digital euro payments? The AML-CFT (Anti-Money Laundering) framework will apply, mutatis mutandis, to digital euro services (Art. 37).

22. Technical Realities vs. Legal Silence. This general discourse on the digital euro obscures technical and computational realities: settlement infrastructure, interfaces, unique account numbers, and even the possibility of "programmable money." For now, the digital euro is designed as a stable, non-programmable unit. The tradition of the unity of currency is preserved. This discussion has attempted to situate the digital euro within a general framework of banking and financial law. The more computational money becomes, the more imperceptible it is, the more easily it circulates; we then merely guess at this "almost nothing," this insensitive financial object. As its mass grows, this "almost nothing" holds the economy. Thus, one may now believe in "almost nothing" which, as purported money, becomes a financial reality—for instance, an instrument of speculation: a cryptocurrency. Launching software into the "intercyber" void is easier than building a digital euro, which requires years of public debate.

23. Conclusion. Is the digital euro a new monetary instrument? Yes, in legal theory; no, in positive law, as this notion has been lost. France, by failing to preserve the notion, failed to teach it to Europe. The digital euro is thus a "means of payment": fortunate is he who does not confuse it with a Payment Instrument (PI). The payment card, the check, the bank transfer—these are, in law, the "means of payment." Currency is confusedly relegated to a PI. In legal theory, however, this PI of a PSP cannot be conflated with the currency itself. Despite an imprecise discourse, the regulation does not lose the thread of money. It fails, however, to unify within one chapter the purely monetary rules of the digital euro (legal tender, central nature) and, in another, the heavy rules of its digital form.

The era in which Jevons studied money in concrete terms by observing coins and banknotes is long past.

He focused on describing coins and banknotes with precision: these were the 'monetary instruments' as they have occasionally been termed in French legislation. Yet, even today, prior to any quantitative consideration, it remains essential to define what money is—and, increasingly, where it resides. To achieve this, one must now examine IT structures, infrastructures, and superstructures, down to the minutest digital entry, file, or account. This entails engaging with the most fascinating legal and digital concept of our time: the system.